Fuck Yeah Marxism-Leninism

From ‘The History of USSR-China Relations’ by Vince Copeland

The carefully hidden differences between the Chinese CP and Stalin first came to light in 1956 and 1957, three or four years after Stalin’s death. In one of the first public revelations of this, the Chinese said:

“Stalin displayed certain great-nation chauvinist tendencies in relation to brother parties and countries. The essence of such tendencies lies in being unmindful of the independent and equal status of the communist parties of various lands and that of the socialist countries.”[1]

In light of the subsequent Chinese repudiation of Khrushchev and reestablishment of Stalin, these powerful words from the Chinese are worth some study. It would appear that Stalin, the author of “Marxism and the National Question,” violated the spirit of his own youthful essay, and so much so that the Chinese repeated this criticism several times after his death.

The point, however, is not so much the role of Stalin in particular as it is the question of great-nation chauvinism in general. Every word of the above quotation burns with repressed anger against arrogant treatment and violations of the “independent and equal status” of the persons who wrote it. The fact that it does not specifically mention the experiences of the Chinese themselves is all the more eloquent. How many times more sharply the Chinese must have felt these things considering that they had been members of an oppressed nation and accustomed to the contemptuous treatment of the British and American imperialists over decades and generations!

This charge of great-nation chauvinism runs like a red thread through all the subsequent arguments with Khrushchev, and Brezhnev, too, even when the actual words are not mentioned. The accusation against Stalin arises not from a casual remembrance but from a still burning sense of injustice in the old relationship now projected into the new one.

To show that this great-nation arrogance among the leaders of the Soviet CP had existed for a very long time, let us go back to the year 1922. It was Stalin’s idea at that time that all the formerly oppressed nations within the territory of what was once Czarist Russia should simply join the already existing Russian Socialist Federation of Soviet Republics (RSFSR) after the civil war on the principle of autonomy for each.

Lenin strongly objected to this and proposed:

“We recognize ourselves as equal with the Ukrainian Republic and the others, and join the new union, the new federation, together with them and on equal footing.”[2]

In accordance with Lenin’s advice, the draft was changed, the first congress of the various nations was held on December 30, 1922, and the new Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was founded in equal comradeship by the Russian and non-Russian nations together.

Lenin warns about ‘the Russian frame of mind’

About the same time, Lenin bitterly denounced Stalin’s narrowness on the national question, particularly in respect to Georgia, Stalin’s own homeland:

“I also fear that Comrade Dzerzhinsky, who went to the Caucasus to investigate the crime of those nationalist-socialists distinguished himself there by his truly Russian frame of mind [it is common knowledge that people of other nationalities who have become Russified overdo the Russian frame of mind].” [3]

After severely criticizing another of Stalin’s close collaborators, Orjonikidze, for actual brutality on the scene in Georgia and recommending “suitable punishment” for him, Lenin continues:

“The political responsibility for all this truly Great-Russian campaign must, of course, be laid on Stalin and Dzerzhinsky.”[4]

And concluding with prophetic clarity about future relations with China, he writes:

“It would be unpardonable opportunism if, on the eve of the debut of the East, just as it is awakening, we undermine our prestige with its peoples, even if only by the slightest crudity or injustice towards our own non-Russian nationalities. The need to rally against the imperialists of the West … is one thing … It is another thing when we ourselves lapse, even if only in trifles, into imperialist attitudes towards oppressed nationalities, thus undermining all our principled sincerity, all our principled defense of the struggle against imperialism.” [5]

In this short passage Lenin pinpoints not just the uncommunist Great-Russian chauvinism of Stalin, but also the chauvinist failings of a number of others — Lenin’s diplomatically designated “we ourselves” — who were to inherit the Soviet Party along with Stalin.

To those who are used to thinking of socialist countries as utopias rather than as historical advances of the working class which still bear the birthmarks from the tortured capitalist past, Stalin’s defects and these sharp words of Lenin may be somewhat of a letdown. But even if Lenin’s criticism had been twice as sharp, this would not have indicated that the revolution-based USSR was actually imperialist, in spite of the uncommunist “imperialist attitudes” of some of its leaders.

The USSR, like the People’s Republic of China and other socialist countries, is not the political expression of a group of individual leaders, but an objective complex of concrete social institutions that emerged from the revolutionary action of millions of people. These millions were under the leadership of a Marxist party, to be sure, but they physically smashed not only the old ruling class, but also its armies, prisons, courts, and property relations. This being the case, a number of “bad” leaders could later put a braking effect upon the full benefits of the new social institutions, including the effect of social backwardness on many questions. But they could not by a mere act of political will turn these institutions back into their opposite, that is, capitalist, imperialist institutions. …

Let us take the case of Stalin himself. His interference with the Chinese CP at an earlier date did not arise so much from innate feelings of superiority as from caution about breaking the defense treaty (against Japan) with the still powerful Chiang Kai-shek. But the Chinese now interpret this first and foremost as “great-nation chauvinism.” And this chauvinism was undoubtedly a factor in Stalin’s attitude, since he continually put his judgment about the Chinese revolution (which happened to be wrong anyway) ahead of theirs and imposed it on them. …

The inequalities in Stalin’s time were far more advanced than in the time of Lenin, who had already said, “What we really have is a workers’ state with bureaucratic distortions.” [6] Stalin still further emphasized the imperialist attitude, however unconsciously, because of his lack of faith in the Chinese revolution.

Khrushchev, and later Brezhnev, merely carried this position still further to the right, although with some oscillations to the left. With all three leaders it was in varying degrees a combination of national chauvinism and fear of the power of imperialism while they still governed a country whose advanced, dynamic social system had been established by the greatest revolution in human history.

Thus the Soviet leaders under Stalin at first provided little help for the Chinese CP in the crucial civil war of 1945-1949, [7] partly because they had no faith that it would succeed [8] and partly because they feared the consequences of success (such as a new war). But great-nation chauvinism was also an element in their lack of faith. The Chinese carefully noted Stalin’s consideration for Roosevelt and Churchill during World War II and saw that he continued to ally himself with the U.S. puppet Chiang Kai-shek long after their own civil war against Chiang had begun. …

Chinese CP refuses to give up its arms

In 1945 and 1946, when Chiang proposed (at U.S. prompting) that the Chinese CP join with the bourgeois Kuomintang in a coalition government, Stalin and the Soviet leadership went along with the idea. But it was undoubtedly the Chinese CP that decided to accept the coalition only on the condition that the Communist Red Army keep its weapons and remain intact. [11]

When Chiang refused to agree with this condition, he touched off a civil war — at first somewhat to the surprise and concern of Stalin and the other Soviet leaders.

The Soviet leaders had calculated that Chiang would rule China for a long period after the defeat of imperialist Japan, and Stalin accordingly made agreements with Chiang (as against Japan) at the post-war Potsdam Conference without necessarily consulting the Chinese CP. And of course Stalin recognized the Chiang government as the exclusive representative of China at the formation of the United Nations after the war, even though he was well aware that the Chinese CP already controlled hundreds of thousands of square miles of China and had the allegiance of millions of people.

Stalin apparently thought the fighting was over after eight years of war with Japan. He apparently thought that the Chinese CP would give up its arms and enter the bourgeois government as a “loyal opposition,” just as the French and Italian CPs had done.

This did not prevent him from welcoming the victorious Chinese revolution into the Soviet bloc four years later in the middle of the Cold War, in spite of the problems it created for him. Similarly, Khrushchev welcomed the Cuban revolution, although he had a general policy of accommodation with the U.S. — incidentally proving as Stalin did that a non-revolutionary policy does not prove there is a non-revolutionary state.

In addition to all the problems the Chinese CP had with Chiang Kai-shek, they had many with the leaders of the first workers’ state. They might have correctly criticized the Soviet leadership for its conduct during the Chinese revolution, while making sure to underline the working class character of the USSR. But in the context of the Cold War such an approach could have been interpreted as a blow against the foundations as well as the superstructure of the USSR. Such a line might have isolated the revolution and the infant revolutionary Chinese state and left it open to penetration by the imperialist United States.

But nevertheless, relations between the two parties were difficult. [12] It was not until after the Chinese CP took power, and even then, not until Mao’s trip to the Soviet Union late in December 1949, that relations between the two national parties were really good. [13] (It is noteworthy that this was Mao’s first trip to Moscow, while his old opponents in the Chinese CP had gone there again and again, mainly to get support against him.) [14]

There was much imperialist speculation about a break between the two parties — and countries — during the weeks that Mao was in the Soviet Union (December 1949-February 1950) negotiating a treaty with Stalin. And there was a feverish intrigue of U.S. agents in Hong Kong and other places to prevent an agreement from taking place at all.